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Military Reserves and Social Welfare 
 
Traditionally, the role of military reservists has been limited to the augmentation of regular forces 
during wartime.  Increasingly, however, this is no longer the case:  “Many powerful nations no longer 
manage their reserves as strictly strategic assets meant only to be used in the event of major war.  
Canada, Australia, Japan, Israel, and the nations of Western Europe now rely on their reserves as 
essential operational components within their total military forces.”1    
 
Motivating the growing reliance on reserve forces is the belief that offering reserve enlistment options 
makes it possible to recruit high quality personnel.  But is the recruitment of high quality reservists – 
something that entails considerable financial cost – really worth the resultant social benefits?  
 
In this paper, we consider the efficacy of offering reserve enlistment options in overcoming the 
asymmetric information problems widely believed to be the central inefficiency in the military 
recruitment process.2  We argue that by allowing recruits to choose regular or reserve duty, the military 
can induce volunteers to reveal private information regarding their true ability – information that can be 
exploited in order to achieve a more efficient allocation of military manpower – since volunteers 
interested in maximizing income are likely to choose reserve service if their private expectations for 
civilian sector wages are high.   
                                                          
1
 Nagl and Sharp (2010), p. 12 
2
 For excellent reviews of the economics of military manpower, see Williams and Gilroy (2006) and Asch, Hosek, 
and Warner (2007). 
 
This paper is divided into four sections.  In Section 2, we lay out the model’s basic architecture.  In 
Section 3, we identify the socially optimal level of reserve recruitment under various conditions.  In 
Section  4, we conclude the paper and offer some thoughts regarding the role of reserve forces.    
 
Section 2: The Model 
 
Following Berck and Lipow (2011), we assume that each potential recruit has a type z, which defines her 
marginal value product (wage) in a competitive private sector.  The distribution of z is uniform on the 
unit interval.  We assume that a recruit’s type cannot be directly observed by the government, and 
constitutes private information known only to that person. 
 
Recruits are offered three choices.  They can (i) remain civilians and earn z; (ii) join the regular military 
and earn wage wM; or (iii) join the reserves and earn an aggregate income of pwR + (1-p)z, where p is the 
proportion of work time reservists devote to military activity.  We assume that they choose the option 
that gives them the highest income.  Potential volunteers will choose to join the regular military if wM > z 
and wM > pwR + (1-p)z.  Potential volunteers will join the reserves if WR > z and wM < pwR + (1-p)z.  The 
criteria for joining the reserves cannot be met unless wM < wR, hence that is a requirement for there to 









.                                                                                                                                                       (1) 
Individuals of types [0,z*] will volunteer to serve as regulars, individuals of types [z*,wR] will join the 
reserves, and individuals of types [wR, 1] remain civilians.  The number of regulars is given by z*, and 
number of reserves by wR – z*.  The aggregate size of the military is given by Q, the number of regulars, 
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Q is not changed by raising the reserve wage.  When 1/p reservists join the military, the regular military 
force declines by one. 
 
Let F be the total amount of military capability fielded.  The value of F depends both on Q as well as the 
productivity of each soldier in producing military capability.  Let g(z) be the military productivity of a 
person of type z.  For brevity, we assume that regulars and reserves are equally efficient at producing 
military capability.3  We assume that F is simply the sum of the military productivities of those who 
serve, implying constant marginal returns: 
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  Williams and Evans (2007) find no evidence that reservists perform worse than regulars.  Ben-Ari and Lomsky-
Feder (2001), however, report that it is widely believed amongst commanders that reserve forces are of inferior 
quality.  
Section 3: Can Reserve Enlistments Enhance Social Welfare? 
 
Now, let us identify the circumstances that may make it desirable to introduce reservists into the 
military’s mix of forces.  We start by defining B, the social welfare function as   
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where the first two terms sum up to F, T represents the total cost of taxation (including deadweight 
losses), and the last two terms represent the benefits to regulars and reservists stemming from their 
military service.  We assume T’ is constant and that T’>1.  
 
First, consider the case where all soldiers contribute equally to defense capability regardless of their 
value in the civilian economy.  Mathematically, this means that g(z) is equal to some constant value.  To 
determine the optimal reserve wage, we take the derivative with respect to wR: 
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Combining terms and simplifying, the first derivative of B can then be expressed as: 
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Evaluated at the point where there are no reserves, wR - wM is equal to zero.  Taking the second 
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Because T’>1, this term is always negative, and therefore any increase in wR above wM will reduce B.  
Thus, when military productivity does not depend on civilian type, it will be optimal to have no reserves.   
 
Empirical analyses generally conclude, however, that military productivity actually does depend on 
civilian abilities.  Warner and Asch (1996) succinctly summarize the literature: “Higher quality personnel 
have been demonstrated to be more productive.”  To reflect this, let us now consider the possibility that 
talented recruits are more productive in a military setting:  g’(z) >0.  Taking the derivative of B, we get: 
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This is always zero when evaluated at wR=wM , because z* will then be equal to wR.  It is sufficient, 
however, that the 2nd derivative be positive at wR=wM for it to make sense to introduce at least some 
reserves into the force mix.  The second derivative is given by: 
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Evaluated at wR=wM, this will be positive if g’(wM) > 2T’ – 1.   
 The logic underpinning the result is that substituting reservists for regulars is financially costly but 
increases the quality of the force.  If the gain to social welfare stemming from the recruitment of higher 
quality recruits more than offsets the damage to social welfare stemming  from the resultant loss of 
civilian output and the deadweight losses resulting from the taxation required to finance the reservists’ 
wages, then it makes sense to recruit at least some reservists.    
 
Since we have assumed T’ is constant, the optimal number reservists will be determined primarily by the 
behavior of g.  If g is linear, then there are only two possible results:  the optimal value of wR will be 
either wM or 1.  If g’<2T’–1, then it will be optimal to set wR equal to wM and have no reserves.  If g’>2T’–
1, then it will be optimal to set wR equal to one, assuring that every eligible individual is participating in 
the military. 
 
A similar situation arises if g is convex.  When g is convex, g’ is increasing.  Thus, if a small increase in wR 
above wM results in an increase in B, further increases will do so as well (at an increasing rate).  Hence,  
the optimal value of wR will be either wM or 1.  If g’(wM) > 2T’ - 1 then the optimal value will be 1.  If, 
however, g’(wM) ≤ 2T’ – 1, B has to be computed for both wM and 1 and then compared. 
 
Now, let us consider the situation when g is concave.  In this case, the sufficient condition for a positive 
quantity of reserves will generally be a necessary condition as well.  To be exact, g’(wM) > 2T’ - 1 will be a 
necessary condition if: 
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for all wR > wM. The reason for this is that, as reservists are added, the number of regular soldiers 
declines.  Hence, in addition to the rate at which g’(wR) declines as wR increases, identification of the 
optimum number of reservists also depends on the rate that g’(z*) increases as z* declines. 
 
 Assuming a sufficiently small value of p, (10) will hold for all reasonable concave functional forms.  
When this is the case, and g’(wM) > 2T’ - 1, then the optimal value of wR will straightforwardly be given 
by the first-order condition: 
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The left side of (11) reflects the military benefit of adding an additional reservist, minus the military loss 
of converting a regular soldier into a reservist.  The right side of (11) reflects the cost of paying the 
additional reservist, minus the savings from converting a regular soldier into a reservist.   
 
Should (10) not hold, a positive number of reserves may still be desirable even if g’(wM)≤ 2T’ – 1.  The 
only way to determine the optimal number of reservists is to compute B for all wR that solve (11) and for 
wR = wM and compare the resultant levels of social welfare.
4 
 
Section 4: Conclusion 
                                                          
4
 It may be necessary to compute the value of B for wR = 1 as well. 
 In this paper, we considered the role that reserve forces could play in overcoming the asymmetric 
information problems that cause inefficiency in the military manpower market.  Our analysis suggests 
that the introduction of reserve forces as an integral operational component of the peacetime military 
only makes sense if there is a sufficiently strong relationship between recruits’ productivity as civilians 
and as soldiers.  This relationship, of course, depends critically on the technology used to produce 
military capability.  The efficacy of reserve forces is likely to evolve with changes in that technology.  
 
Near term, it is likely that considerations of efficiency and social welfare will lead to greater reliance on 
reserve forces.  For example, in China “the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) increasingly recruits civilian 
reservists who lack prior military service but possess high-tech skills with military applicability.”5  Clearly, 
this can only make sense if highly skilled civilians are especially valuable when mobilized for military 
service.  With advanced technological skills a growing component of defense technology, it seems 
reasonable to expect that this relationship will continue to strengthen.  Reliance on reserve forces is 
likely to grow in the foreseeable future.    
                                                          
5
 Nagl and Sharp (2010), p. 12 
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